🔗 Share this article

During the first week of December, President Trump brought together the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to sign a peace agreement. His pledge was an end to years of warfare in the volatile eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Weeks later, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had executed Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, hitting sites connected to the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

This contrast encapsulates the defining principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this administration: a de-emphasis from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and ending wars—even as this aligns with the nascent air campaign in Nigeria is yet unclear.

“Our view has shifted from Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan we’ve seen thrown around for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a top U.S. state department official in a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

An administration spokesperson stated this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Strategic Results and Inconsistencies

This change is consequential, but analysts caution it is early to judge its results. The approach is intertwined with the President’s unconventional diplomacy, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and negative rhetoric towards Africans.

“The organizing principle is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” explained a scholar for Africa studies at a influential foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of additional deaths globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has adversely affected African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Friction

Differing from his immediate predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later acknowledged using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant disagreement has developed with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” noted a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Involvement

An analogous confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the stern rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had consented to the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

Trump has been open his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

Similar to Competitors

Observers see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “a state that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The involvement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.